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In the standard Schumpeterian-growth models only follower firms invest
in R&D activities and larger economies grow faster. Since these results
are counterfactual, this paper reveals that leader firms often support
R&D activities and economic growth can be independent of the market
size. In particular, the maintenance of R&D leadership increases with: (i)
the technological-knowledge gap between leader and followers, since a
firm-specific learning effect of accumulated technological knowledge
from past R&D is considered, (ii) the leaders’ strategies that delay the
next successful R&D supported by some follower firm, (iii) the market
size, and (iv) the up-grade of each innovation.
1 Introduction
Most Schumpeterian-growth models (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 1991)
assumed that the leadership of the firms that produce state-of-the-art quali-
ties is only temporary, as they are permanently subject to destruction by new
qualities. That is, since all firms, the leader and followers, have access to the
same R&D technology in each good, once a firm achieves success and
becomes a monopoly, it does not support new R&D activity. In fact, in this
context, the incentives of leaders to invest in R&D are lower due to the
‘Arrow (1962) effect’, i.e. the expected gain of the leader is just the difference
between expected profits with the next successful R&D and the existing one,
while the expected gain for each follower is given by all the expected profits
with the next successful R&D.
However, the empirical evidence shows that this pattern of leapfrogging
is unrealistic (e.g. Scherer, 1984, ch. 11; Blundell et al., 1999; Etro, 2004;
Aghion and Griffith, 2005). In an issue of The Economist (2004), the authors
of the ‘Economics Focus’ column stated that leaders may have a far more
vital role in producing innovations than previously thought; they further
expressed doubts about the prevailing economic theory according to which
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the ‘monopolist (leader) should have far less incentives to invest in creating
innovations than a firm in a competitive environment (follower)’.1
A number of solutions to this contradiction have been projected; most of
these are rooted in some technological-knowledge advantage of the leader,
which, in turn, implies that its incentives to support R&D can offset the
‘Arrow effect’.
Thus, some studies assume that leaders have R&D cost advantage over
followers and/or there are diminishing returns in R&D effort at the firm level,
implying that they can apply resources to R&D (e.g. Segerstrom and
Zolnierek, 1999; Segerstrom, 2007). Others assume that customers’ loyalty
assures the leader cheaper distribution channels (e.g. Canton and Uhlig,
1999). Others further present models in which leaders apply resources in
rent-protecting activities to extend the monopoly duration (e.g. Dinopoulos
and Syropoulos, 2004, 2007). In Denicolò (2001) persistent leadership is
explained by assuming non-drastic innovations and a move advantage in the
next patent race. In Chang and Wu (2006), in turn, the technological know-
ledge is accumulated by R&D expenditures and by production experiences,
which increases persistent leadership. Additional studies such as Aghion et al.
(2001) and Klette and Kortum (2004) analyse the R&D incentives of leaders;
in the former, followers support R&D to catch up with leaders and then they
can support R&D to enhance their own goods; in the latter, leaders support
R&D to enhance other leaders’ goods and become multi-good firms.
Another odd feature of most Schumpeterian-growth models is that the
economy’s growth rate increases as its size/scale does. The literature has been
debating the role of scale effects since Jones (1995a) criticized the seminal
work of Romer (1990), on the grounds that it unreasonably predicted positive
market-size effect on growth. In addition to theoretical arguments, several
authors have supplied the debate with empirical evidence against strong scale
effects (e.g. Backus et al., 1992; Jones, 1995b; Dinopoulos and Thompson,
1999; Zachariadis, 2003). Starting with Jones (1995a) himself, who has prop-
erly modified Romer’s (1990) R&D technology, several modelling efforts
have been made to eliminate scale effects.2
We develop an endogenous growth model to explain why all firms,
leaders and followers, can support R&D activities and in which economic
growth can be scale independent. We consider a standard economic structure:
the production of perfectly competitive final goods uses labour together with
quality-adjusted intermediate goods, which, in turn, use innovative designs
under monopolistic competition.
Our model differs from standard Schumpeterian-growth models by
jointly considering three crucial assumptions reflected in the R&D sector: (i)
1See Sutton (2007) for theoretical and empirical issues about the evaluation of leaders’
maintenance.
2See Jones (1999) and Segerstrom (1998) for detailed discussion of scale effects and ways to avoid
them.
Maintenance and Destruction of R&D Leadership 741
© 2012 The Authors
The Manchester School © 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and The University of Manchester
there can be either constant or diminishing returns to R&D effort at the firm
level (in line with, for example, Kortum, 1993), (ii) the leader has no cost
advantage over followers, but (ii.1) it has a specific endogenous positive
learning effect of accumulated technological knowledge from past successful
R&D (along the lines of, for example, Gruber, 1994) and (ii.2) it can use its
position to preserve economic revenue by delaying the successful R&D sup-
ported by followers (as stated by, for example, Dinopoulos and Syropoulos,
2004, 2007).
In particular, the latter assumption allows us to remove the scale effects.
In our case, scale effects are connected to the size of profits that, in each
period, accrue to the leaders; a larger market expands profits and, thus, the
incentives to allocate resources to R&D, thereby increasing the economic
growth rate. They can be removed by assuming that the difficulty in conduct-
ing R&D is proportional to the size of the market measured by the labour
level. This is consistent with the literature which observes that increases in
costs of scale are related to strategies, like technical barriers, undertaken by
leaders to delay successful R&D by followers, with the objective of prolong-
ing their temporary monopoly power (e.g. Dinopoulos and Syropoulos, 2004,
2007). The considered scale-removing ‘permanent-effects-on-growth’ speci-
fication, in the Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) terminology, is compatible
with endogenous economic growth.
Since the two mentioned strands of the literature—R&D leadership and
scale effects—have been dealt with separately, the implications of merging
them have not yet been explored. In particular, we show that persistent
leadership increases with the: (i) technological-knowledge gap between leader
and followers, (ii) market size, (iii) up-grade of each innovation, and (iv)
strength of the leaders’ strategies that delay the next innovation, which also
contribute to rule out scale effects. Indeed, in these situations, R&D sup-
ported by leaders is relatively more profitable.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model. In
Section 3, we derive the steady state and we describe the results. In Section 4,
we conclude.
2 The Model
The economy is populated by a time-invariant number of individuals, which
supply labour, consume final goods and own firms. Final goods are produced
under perfect competition by combining labour and quality-adjusted inter-
mediate goods. Quality-adjusted intermediate goods are produced under
monopolistic competition by using aggregate output and innovative designs.
Designs are obtained through R&D activities.
Since we are interested in the competition between producers of each
intermediate good, the Schumpeterian approach, in which R&D is directed at
developing new vertically differentiated qualities, is more suitable than the
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horizontal one, where R&D is directed at developing new differentiated
goods. Our option is thus in line with, for example, Scherer (1980), who
quotes survey evidence indicating that the lion’s share of R&D by firms is
directed at enhancing existing goods, and also with Scherer (1984), who
shows that both leaders and followers can support R&D activities.
2.1 Consumers
A time-invariant number of individuals decide between consumption and
savings. The individual infinite horizon lifetime utility is the integral of a
discounted constant inter-temporal elasticity of substitution (CIES) utility,
U t
c t
t t( exp) ≡ ( ) −
−
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥ −( )
−
∞∫ 10 11
θ
θ
ρ d (1)
where c(t) is individual consumption at time t, r > 0 is the homogeneous
discount rate, and q > 0 is the inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of
substitution.
The individual budget constraint equalizes income earned to consump-
tions plus savings, at each t. Savings consist of accumulation of financial
assets—K, with return r—in the form of ownership of the firms that produce
intermediate goods in monopolistic competition. The value of these firms, in
turn, corresponds to the value of patents in use. The budget constraint,
expressed as Savings + Consumptions = Income, is
K t c t r t K t w t( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )+ = + (2)
where K t( ) is the change in K(t) at time t, and w(t) is the wage of the
individual at t.
Maximizing (1) subject to (2) yields the solution for the consumption
growth rate, cˆ(t), which is independent of the individual and is the standard
Euler equation:
ˆ( ) ˆ ( )
( )
( ) ( )c t C t
r t
C t c t L= =
−
≡
ρ
θ
where (3)
2.2 Final and Intermediate Goods
Production of each final good n ∈ [0, 1] under perfect competition uses
labour, L, and a set of quality-adjusted intermediate goods j ∈ [0, J ]. The
constant returns to scale production function of final good n, Yn, at time t is
Y t A q x k j t j Ln k j t n
J
n( ) ( , , ),= ( )⎡⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
( ) −∫ 1
0
α αd (4)
where A > 0 is the exogenous level of productivity and 0 < a < 1 is the labour
share in production. The integral denotes the aid of intermediate goods to
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production. In the Schumpeterian tradition, the quantity, xn, is quality-
adjusted, i.e. q > 1 is the size of each quality upgrade and k is the top quality
rung at t.3 Due to zero profit equilibrium by producers of n ∈ [0, 1], the
demand for the top quality of j by the producer of n is
x k j t L t
p t A
p k j t
qn n
n k j t( , , ) ( )
( ) ( )
( , , )
/
( , ) ( ) /
=
−⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
−[1
1
1α
α
α α] (5)
where pn and p( j ) are, respectively, the prices of n and j. A higher: pn increases
the marginal revenue product of the factors, encouraging firms to rent more
intermediate goods; Ln implies more labour to use intermediate goods, raising
demand; p( j) implies lower demand, since the demand curve for intermediate
goods is downward sloping.
Plugging the demand for top quality in each j (5) into (4),4 the supply of
n is
Y t A
p t
p j t
L Q t Q t qn
n
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k( )
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where j t
J
j, ) ( )α α
−
−∫ 1 10 d (6)
measures the aggregate technological knowledge.
We define the aggregate output, Y t p t Y t nn n( ) ( ) ( )≡ =∫ d01
exp ln ( )Y t nn d
0
1∫⎡⎣ ⎤⎦, as the numeraire, i.e. we normalize its price to one at each
t. Resources, Y, can be used in production of intermediate goods, X, in R&D
activities, D, and in consumption, C.
Since Y is the input of j, the marginal cost of producing j is one. Its
production also involves a start-up R&D cost, which can be recovered
because a patent law assures positive profits at each date for a certain amount
of time. The profit-maximization price yields the stable (over t, across j and
for all k) mark-up p(k, j, t) = p = 1/(1 - a) > 1.
Since the leader is the one legally allowed to produce the top quality,5 it
will use pricing to wipe out lower qualities. Depending on whether q(1 - a) >
1 or q(1 - a) < 1, the leader will use either the monopoly pricing p = 1/(1 - a)
or the limit pricing p = q to capture the entire market. We assume that limit
pricing strategy is binding (as, for example, Grossman and Helpman, 1991,
ch. 4; Afonso, 2008) and thus is used by all firms.
3Since the various qualities of j are perfect substitutes, due to profit maximizing by monopolist
firms of j ∈ [0, J ], in equilibrium only the top quality of each j is demanded by final-goods
firms.
4As we will see below, the profit maximizing by monopolist firms implies that p( j) is independent
of j.
5That is, the inventor has the monopolistic profit under the protection of the patent until the next
top quality.
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As q is the quality advantage over the closest follower, the leader can
successfully capture the entire market by selling at a price slightly below q;6
thus, q is also an indicator of the market power of the incumbent firm in each
intermediate good.
2.3 R&D Sector
The results of R&D are designs, which improve the quality of intermediate
goods, while creatively destroying the profits from previous qualities (e.g.
Grossman and Helpman, 1991, ch. 4; Afonso, 2008). In contrast with initial
Schumpeterian-growth models (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 1991, ch. 4) in
which only followers researched a higher-quality good to deprive the current
leader, in our case the current leader enters the R&D process (as well as
followers) in order to maintain its leadership.
Let Iz(k, j, t) denote the instantaneous probability of successful R&D in
the next top quality, k( j, t) + 1, by the leader, z = l, or by a follower, z = f, in
j at t,
I k j t d k j t F qz z k j tz z( , , ) ( , , ) ( )
( ) ( )
( , )
(
= ⋅
−δ δ η β
i ii ii
    
1
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( ) ( )
     ⋅ ⋅
− − −
−ζ α ξ1 1q Lk j t z (7)
where:
(i) dz(k, j, t) is the flow of Y devoted to R&D by z in j at t, and 0 < d 2 1
measures the degree of returns to R&D effort at the firm level;7
(ii) F is the number of followers (under free entry, F → +•), and hf = 1 and
hl = 0;
(iii) βqk j tz ( , ), b > 0, is the positive learning effect of accumulated public
technological knowledge from past R&D in j at t (e.g. Connolly, 2003),
which, since k = kl > kf, implies that the leader has an R&D advantage
over followers; defining q as the relative technological-knowledge level
of f, and Ql (= Q in (5)) and Q q jk j
J
f
f d≡
−
−∫ ( ) ( )α α1 10 as the technological
knowledge of leaders and followers, respectively, we have
q q
q
q
q q j t q
Q t
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( , ) ( , )
( , )
( , )
( , ) ( , )( , )
(
= = =
)
( )
( ) ( ) ;( , )J
Q t
J
q Q t Q tk j t
l
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(8)
6Since the lowest price that the closest follower can charge without negative profits is one.
7Empirical evidence on returns to scale to R&D level is inconclusive (e.g. Kortum, 1993; Lach,
1995); and diminishing returns may arise because firms have a limited number of expected
useful ideas at each t.
8That is, to have an adequate measure of q j t( , ), we assume that the technological-knowledge
gap between followers and the leader in j is described by an average (representative)
intermediate good, Q.
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(iv) ζ α− − −1 1q k j t( , ), z > 0, is the adverse effect caused by the increasing com-
plexity of quality improvements in j at t (e.g. Kortum, 1997);
(v) L Lz− > ≥ > >ξ ξ ξ( , )1 1 0f l captures the idea that the difficulty of intro-
ducing new qualities is proportional to the market size, due to co-
ordination among agents, processing of ideas, informational, organ-
izational, transportation and marketing costs (e.g. Dinopoulos and
Segerstrom, 1999; Dinopoulos and Thompson, 1999). Moreover, by
assuming that 1 3 xf > xl > 0, we reflect in R&D the leaders’ strategies
(e.g. Dinopoulos and Syropoulos, 2004, 2007), which, by decreasing
xl and thus favouring Il(k, j, t), delay the next successful R&D by
followers.9
We must stress that: (i) since b /z is independent of z, our option is
different from, for example, Segerstrom and Zolnierek (1999) in which the
leader has an R&D cost advantage over followers, (ii) since, in each j, the
leader and followers support R&D and make their R&D decisions simultan-
eously, independently and are free to adjust R&D inputs at t, the probability
of success is I k j t I k j t I k j t
F
( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , )
( )
= +
=
=+∞∑l f
f 1
, and (iii) since followers in
j enjoy the same technology and their returns are independent (7) allows for
aggregation.
3 Steady State
We start the steady-state analysis by comparing the profits of followers
taking over the leader place, DPf(k, j, t) = Pf( k, j, t), with the incremental
profits of leaders replacing themselves, DPl(k, j, t). Since limit price is binding
and the profits for the producer of j using a research of quality k at t relies on
the mark-up and on the demand, we have10
ΔΠ f ( , , ) ( )
( ) ( , )( )k j t L q
A
q
qk j t= −
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⎤
⎦⎥
−
−
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1
1
1
1 11α
α
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−⎡⎣ ⎤⎦−
−
q( )α α1
1
(9b)
From equations (9a) and (9b), the gain to a follower is greater so long as
q1/a > 1, which is guaranteed by assumptions q > 1 and 0 < a < 1, i.e. the
9Thus, we distinguish successful R&D leading to creative destruction from leaders’ strategies that
slow down the process of creative destruction. That is, we consider that leaders acquire
specific technological knowledge that, once used, can partially and temporarily insulate
them from the threat of leapfrogging by followers. Such strategies include, for example,
trade secrecy and time pacing (e.g. Eisenhardt and Brown, 1998).
10As the leader firm will now be selling a product twice as productive as its nearest competitor,
it will be able to use a price slightly below q2, but it will also lose its profits from its previous
successful research.
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incremental gain of a two-step quality advantage to a leader is smaller than
the gain of a one-step quality advantage to a follower, since the follower goes
from having no profits to having profits when it takes over the leader posi-
tion. This is the ‘replacement or Arrow (1962) effect’.
Let Vz (k, j, t) denote the expected discounted profit earned by z, which
sells a quality k of j at t;11 the problem is tractable because Vz (k, j, t) only
relies on the quality k and not separately on t or j. The Hamilton–Jacobi–
Bellman equation for l in j is
r t V k j t k j t d k j t I k j t V
d k j t
( ) ( , , ) max ( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , )
( , , )
l l l l
l
= − +
≥0
Π l
l F F l
( , , )
( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , )
k j t
V k j t I k j t V k j t V k j t
+[{
− ]+ + −[ ]}
1
1 (10)
That is, l enjoys the monopoly profit flow Pl(k, j, t) while supporting the
dl(k, j, t) cost, with the purpose of maintaining its position. With probability
Il(k, j, t), l is successful and its value shoots up: Vl(k + 1, j, t) - Vl(k, j, t).
With probability IF(k, j, t), l is replaced by some f and its value drops:
VF(k + 1, j, t) - Vl(k, j, t). Similarly, for each f in j
r t V k j t I k j t V k j t V k j t
d k j t
( ) ( , , ) max ( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , )
( , , )
F f l F
f
= + −
≥0
1[ ]−{
+ +[ ] + −
−
d k j t
I k j t I k j t V k j t V k j t
f
F l F F
( , , )
( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , ) ( , ,1 1 )[ ]}
(11)
where I k j tF
−1 ( , , ) is the probability of success by all the other followers
together. Each f earns no profit flow and supports the df(k, j, t) cost to achieve
the success If(k, j, t). In this case, it becomes a leader and its value rises:
Vl(k+1, j, t) - VF(k, j, t). With probability I k j t I k j tF l
−
+1 ( , , ) ( , , ), some other
firm, either another f or l, obtains the next patented design and, thereby, f will
remain so in the next R&D process.
The equalities (10) and (11) mean that the maximized expected return on
the l and f value, respectively, due to a change in k must equal the return on
an equally sized investment in a risk-less bond, r Vz; (10) and (11) also show
that leaders gain less since Vl(k + 1, j, t) - Vl(k, j, t) < Vl(k + 1, j, t) - VF(k, j,
t) (note that under free entry VF(k, j, t) = 0).12
From (7) and (8), the first-order conditions for profit maximization from
(10) and (11) (i.e. [∂r(t)Vz(k, j, t)]/[∂dz(k, j, t)] = 0) and free entry, the relative
innovation rate of leaders is
I
I
I
Q L q≡ = −⎡⎣ ⎤⎦{ }− − − −− −l
F
f l 1 1
1
1
1
1
ξ ξ αδ α δ δ( ) ( ) ( ) (12)
11Hence, V is the market value of the patent or the value of the monopolist firm owned by
individuals.
12Since under free entry F → +•, then the individual contribution of any follower firm to the
aggregate innovation rate of all followers is negligible, i.e. the market value of each follower
equals zero at each t.
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where Il and IF are the equilibrium probabilities of successful R&D by the
leader and by followers, respectively. Il and IF turn out to be independent of
j and k, since the positive effect of the quality rung on profits (see (9a) and
(9b)) and on the learning effect (see (7)-(iii)) is totally offset by its effect on the
complexity cost (see (7)-(iv)). Scale effects could arise through the market
size, as discussed since Jones (1995a, 1995b).
Equation (12) has very intuitive implications, summarized in Theorems
1 and 2.
Theorem 1: Under constant returns to R&D, i.e. computing limδ →1 I, apart
from the particular case in which 1
1 1
− =
−
− − +q QLα α ξ ξ( )  f l, R&D activities are
only supported by
(i) leaders when 1
1 1
− >
−
− − +q QLα α ξ ξ( )  f l;
(ii) followers when 1
1 1
− <
−
− − +q QLα α ξ ξ( )  f l .
Thus, when the technological-knowledge gap between the leader and
followers, Q−1, is large, and/or the leaders’ strategies that delay the next
innovation are intense (small xl), and/or the market size, L, is large, and/or
each quality upgrade, q,13 is higher, only the leader supports R&D. In this
case, 1
1 1
− >
−
− − +q QLα α ξ ξ( )  f l, its R&D advantage more than offsets its disad-
vantage in terms of benefits from successful R&D, i.e. the ‘Arrow (1962)
effect’. Otherwise, 1
1 1
− <
−
− − +q QLα α ξ ξ( )  f l , only followers support R&D activ-
ities since the leader cannot offset the difference in benefits from successful
R&D.
Hence, even under constant returns to R&D, as usual in Schumpeterian-
growth models, Theorem 1 implies when 1
1 1
− >
−
− − +q QLα α ξ ξ( )  f l occurs, only
leaders support R&D activities. However, to better accommodate empirical
evidence (according to which both leaders and followers participate in
R&D—e.g. Blundell et al., 1999), we need to consider diminishing returns to
R&D. From (12), we have
Theorem 2: Under diminishing returns to R&D, i.e. with 0 < d < 1,
(i) R&D activities are supported by both leaders and followers;
(ii) leaders (followers) support relatively more R&D when Q is low (high),
and/or xl is low (high), and/or L is high (low) and/or q is high (low).
Therefore, under diminishing returns to R&D, our theoretical results are
more attractive since leaders always support R&D activities. Bearing in mind,
for example, Scherer (1984, ch. 11), firms with fewer than 1000 employees (a
proxy for followers) were responsible for 47.3 per cent of innovations, which
indicates that the R&D advantage is apparently divided between leaders and
followers.
13When q is very high (i.e. an innovation is drastic), the leader can engage in monopoly pricing.
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It is pertinent to stress the weight of the leaders’ positive learning effect
from past R&D (7)-(iii), and the leaders’ strategies related with scale effects to
delay successful R&D by followers (7)-(v), in theoretical results summarized
in Theorems 1 and 2.
The equilibrium R&D can be translated into the growth rate of Q,
i.e. into the path of technological knowledge, which is given by
ˆ ( ) ( )Q I I q= + −⎡⎣ ⎤⎦− −l F α α1 1 1 because the same R&D intensity applies to all inter-
mediate goods—as stated above, for each j (7)-(iii) together with (7)-(iv)
exactly offsets the positive effect of the quality rung on profits. For example,
under constant returns to R&D, d = 1, and with 1 1 1− <− − − +q QLα α ξ ξ( )  f l , the
following expression (where the equilibrium IF given r is plugged in) is
obtained:
ˆ ( ) (Q L
q
q
A Q r q
I
=
−
−[ ] −
⎧
⎨⎪
⎩⎪
⎫
⎬⎪
⎭⎪
−
≡
−β
ζ α
ξ α1 11 1
1
f
F

  
−
−[ ]α α) / 1 (13)
Since Y, X, D and C are multiples of Q, the stable steady-state endo-
genous growth rate, g*, which through (3) also implies a stable steady-state r,
r*, is
g Q Y X D C c
r
* * * * * * *
*
= = = = = = =
−ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ρ
θ (14)
Thus, r* is obtained by setting Cˆ, in (3), equal to Qˆ, in (14) in which d =
1 and 1
1 1
− <
−
− − +q QLα α ξ ξ( )  f l , and then g* results from plugging r* into (3);
thus, r* is
r q
L
q
q
A Q qf
* = −[ ] +{ }
−
−[ ] −[ ]
−
−
−
−
−
( ) /
( ) /( )
1 1
1 1
1 1
1
1 1
1
α α
ξ α α α
θ
β
ζ α
 θ ρ α α+{ } −[ ]−q( ) /1 1 (15)
Given (15), it immediately follows that:
Theorem 3. If scale effects are removed, the steady-state growth rate is scale
invariant.
Indeed, from (15), when xf = 1, the adverse effect of market size (see
(7)-(v)) offsets the scale effect on profits (see (9a) and (9b)) and, in line with
empirical evidence (e.g. Jones, 1995b), the steady-state growth rate is scale
independent.
4 Concluding Remarks
A common result of most Schumpeterian R&D growth models is that leaders
do not support R&D and larger economies always grow faster. However,
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empirical evidence points out that both followers and leaders play important
roles in producing innovations and that economic growth is independent of
relevant scale effects.
By building an endogenous growth model in which R&D is applied to
intermediate goods used in the production of final goods, we propose, in line
with the observed behaviour of firms, possible new reasons why leaders can
often support R&D. We find that when the technological-knowledge gap
between the leader and followers is large (small), and/or the leaders’ strategies
that delay the next innovation are strong (weak), and/or the market size is
large (small) and/or each quality upgrade is high (low), R&D is only sup-
ported by the leader (followers) under constant returns to R&D effort or is
relatively more supported by the leader (followers) under diminishing
returns.
Moreover, by assuming that the difficulty in conducting R&D is pro-
portional to the size of the market measured by the stock of labour, our
model is consistent with the time-series evidence against important scale
effects on economic growth.
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